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In Spain**

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## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

The ongoing transformation of the *classic* mass parties and the emergence of new party models is one of the main research avenues for party politics scholars. In recent years, several academics have noted the existence of a new phenomenon related to this transformation: the gradual implementation of new, more participatory and thus more democratic mechanisms of intra-party decision-making (Gauja, 2009; Cross and Blais, 2009; Wauters, 2009; Lisi, 2009; Rodríguez-Teruel *et al.*, 2011). This is not an uncontroversial trend. When this pattern toward more participatory decision-making mechanisms within the parties has tried to be tested, the results have been somewhat ambivalent (Scarrow *et al.* 2000; Kittilson and Scarrow, 2006).

Political parties may decide to implement mechanisms to give more voice to party grassroots because of a combination of obligation (party leaders react to external challenges such as declining membership figures) and belief (party leaders respond to internal demands for more voice and participation in key decisions) (Wauters *et al.*, 2011). The first reason –parties change by obligation– is theoretically related to a more general trend towards the cartelization of political parties and party systems (Katz and Mair, 1995). Generally speaking, the argument points out that this shift is part of the set of actions taken from the party boards as a reaction to stop the steady decline of party membership and to bind their members. Paradoxically, these scholars warned that granting formal powers over party members should not hide, on the other hand, the actual loss of powers of party grassroots and the new empowerment of party leaders (Katz and Mair, 1995; Carty, 2004; Bolleyer, 2008). The second explanation –parties change by belief– deals with the complex interaction between leaders and grassroots members. Although the seminal work of Michels pointed out the *psychological conservatism* of party members, change has been explained by several other reasons like the centralisation of party decision-making, ideological disparities, etc. (ie, Michels, 1911; May, 1973; Kitschelt, 1989, Lyons, 2009: 8-9).

However, there are still many questions about how and why this shift towards more internal democracy is actually happening. Focusing at the individual level, one of the problems has to do with the shaping of party members' opinions. What factors determine grassroots' or party middle-elite's views and, more specifically, their opinions on intra-party democracy? The answers to this question have been traditionally influenced by John May's arguments (1973). Nevertheless, the attempts to test his special *law of ideological curvilinear disparity* diverted the attention from other possible answers to the question (Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995; Heidar, 2006; Lyons, 2009). Recent research on green

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parties has shown, for example, the usefulness of considering new sources of support for what has been labelled as *grassroots democracy* (Rüdig, 2005).

The main purpose of this text is to explain what factors determine party middle-level elites' support for intra-party democracy. The evidence gathered on the Spanish case may help to reconsider the introduction of participatory mechanisms of democracy as an elite-driven tool to respond to party decline. Spain is widely considered a deviant case in both the party membership decline phenomenon, and with regards to the absence of more participatory and democratic decision-making mechanisms (Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen, 2003, Mendez *et al.*, 2004; Ramiro and Morales, 2008; Rodríguez-Teruel *et al.*, 2011). The steady increase in membership figures may suggest this is a reason to explain why Spanish parties haven't moved towards more participatory mechanisms. However, following the obligation-and-belief assumption, we must also consider to what extent party leaders are facing real democratizing demands and pressures from below. In particular, we will focus on the reasons that explain why some party middle-level elites are more willing to internal party democracy than others. We observe party delegates' views from several Spanish parties between 2008 and 2010. Our results conclude that strongest supporters to more participatory parties are to be found amongst the less pragmatics rank-and-file members and less involved in party organization, those who join the party recently, the leftist members and those who express more disagreement with party leaders and with the party ideological outlook.

The next section introduces some hypothesis to explain the support to internal democracy amongst Spanish party middle-level elites. Then we present the data employed in the analysis, as well as the concepts and indicators included in the hypothesis. The fourth section will show and discuss the results of our analysis. The last section will conclude.

## **THE SOCIAL AND PARTISAN DETERMINANTS OF PARTY DELEGATES' SUPPORT FOR INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN**

Works devoted to the views of party members often use two models to explain the internal differences. On the one hand, a sociological approach proposes an explanation of the party members' views based on their ideology, political attitudes and cultural traditions (ie., Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995). On the other hand, other authors prioritize the influence of patterns of participation or, more specifically, the incentives generated by the position of members in the organization. One of the first authors to address the shaping of intra-party opinions using a model based on incentives was John May (1973). This author stated that intra-party ideological differences were not to be attributed to psychological or sociological factors, but to the effects of the different incentives that the party strata have in terms of their position occupied within the party. Depending on these incentives, May suggested the existence of three main strata: the voters to whom (according to the Downsian theory) he assigned moderate positions; the sub-elites to whom their position within the party

would lead to be ideologically more extreme than voters; and the elites that had to be accountable both to the voters and the sub-elites, make them to be ideologically among the voters and the sub-elites. Following this approach, we may expect that differences in terms of support to more democratic mechanisms may be different according to the position of people in the organization. As we have already mentioned, party elites conceive the introduction of participatory mechanisms as way to response to party membership decline. In absence of this phenomenon, we may suppose that party elites are not going to be very supportive of these measures. Conversely, for we have suggested that party democracy is also a response to party grassroots demands; people without internal responsibilities are going to be more supportive of intra party-democracy. Following that we can state:

*H1: Party delegates who are not currently holding posts (neither organic nor representative) will be more likely to support intra-party democracy.*

On the other hand, support to more participatory and democratic procedures inside the party could be related not just with posts but, more generically, also with practices. Members who are more involved in party life (activists) may be more aware of the importance of their role in party decisions, and then less likely to transfer power of decision-making to a broader selectorate. On the contrary, members with low involvement in ordinary party life may be less sceptical about grassroots members' views and opinions. Even more, low involved party members are willing to be critical with the trend to oligarchy, and so be reluctant to let *big* decisions in the hands of their leaders. We can hypothesize as follows:

*H2: Activists are less likely to support intra-party democracy than those party delegates less involved in party life.*

We can even think of party members with low involvement and without public or internal posts, but who joined the party long time ago. This seniority might lead them to accommodate and accept easily the leaders' views, since they have had time to learn the organizational culture. In some cases, past support to internal democracy may have been replaced by a cynical view of how decisions are made in complex organizations. Following this, we may expect hypothesis 3.

*H3: Party delegates with more seniority in the organization are less likely to support intra-party democracy than those who has joined the party recently.*

More recently, Rüdig (2005) has suggested the influence of other factors in supporting what he labelled *grassroots democracy* in Green parties. Some of his hypotheses are closely linked to his particular object of study, but others can be applied to many other parties as well. In this sense, the author suggests the importance of ideology (already mentioned) and socialization as relevant factors of support for intra-party democracy. Regarding socialization, Rüdig divides the latter to past and present involvement in the party and in social organizations (other than political parties). Due to the limitation of our questionnaires we are only going to focus on past and present involvement in social organizations. As Rüdig pointed out, in terms of socialization it is conceivable that those

delegates who are or have been involved in other social organizations and have experienced other forms of organization should more critical with the rather hierarchical functioning of political parties. To summarize, it follows:

*H4a: Party delegates who are members of other social organizations are more likely to support intra-party democracy.*

*H4b: Party delegates who were members of other social organizations are more likely to support intra-party democracy.*

*H4c: Party delegates who have friends with high participation in social organizations are more likely to support intra-party democracy.*

The theory of incentives was seriously challenged by Kitschelt (1989). He suggested an alternative way to understand intra-party divisions and conflicts. If May's stated that party strata differed according to its position within the party, Kitschelt proposed a new way of differentiating the different intra-party groups based on their attitudinal orientations. For this author, party member's support or actions on specific issues are conditioned by political values and orientations guidelines. According to this, Kitschelt put forward a distinction between "pragmatists", "ideologues" and "lobbyists" as the key groups within each party<sup>2</sup>. Although Kitschelt's analytical framework was conceived for the Belgian Green parties, it has been tested (not surprisingly as an alternative to May's law) in many European parties (e.g. Norris, 1995; Kennedy, Lyons, Fitzgerald, 2006; Lyons and Lynek, 2007). Kitschelt's argument can help us to generate new hypotheses to our research. As a general hypothesis we would expect that, if party membership is not in decline, ideologues should value more intra-party democracy than pragmatists.

*H5: Ideologues are more likely to support intra-party democracy than pragmatists.*

Another possibility that should not be overlooked is that support for intra-party democracy may be conditioned by the ideology of the party or of their members. Generally speaking, support toward more participatory forms of democracy is clearly associated with left-wing positions. Hence can be derived that party delegates who identify themselves with left-wing positions (regardless of the ideology of their party) should be more committed towards intra-party democracy. Conversely, if the party's ideology can serve to mediate these conceptions then we should expect that party delegates from left parties will be more likely to support intra-party democracy. This could be summarized as follows:

*H6a. Left-wing party delegates are more committed to intra-party democracy.*

*H6b. Party delegates from leftist parties are more likely to support intra-party democracy.*

However, ideology may not count just in absolute terms (left vs. right), but also as an indicator of members' identification to party ideological line. Most party members use to

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<sup>2</sup> Ideologists tend to favor the preservation of the party's ideology to the achievement of electoral goals. For them the party is an end in itself. Pragmatists, however, conceive the organization as a tool for their vote-seeking priorities. Finally, Lobbyists are characterized by their accidental nature to any particular goal, so they can agree with both the pragmatists or the ideologists depending on the circumstances (Kitschelt, 1989).



define themselves from an ideological point of view in the same way they define party ideological outlook. This ideological coherence shows an agreement of members to the party line set by their leaders. By contrast, those who prefer to express ideological differences between them and their party are showing existing disagreements with some aspects of the party (Van Haute and Carty, 2011). These members could opt to leave the party, or they might prefer to stay and to express their voice within the party, or at least to give support for others who do it (Hirschman, 1970). Accordingly:

*H7: Party members who recognize some ideological differences between themselves and their own political party are more likely to support intra-party democracy than those who keep strong similarities with party ideological definition.*

The satisfaction with party leaders may also impact support for internal democracy. Those who are less favourable to the party elites may think that important decisions would be more representative if all members were allowed to participate. Conversely, those who express a better assessment for the party leaders would probably have more confidence in the decisions made by them, as follows:

*H8: Those who express less support to the incumbent party leader might have a stronger support to intra-party democracy.*

## DATA

We conducted different surveys to the delegates attending the party conventions of several Spanish parties between 2008 and 2010. The party conventions were held shortly after the close of the election cycle derived from the local and regional elections of 2007, and the 2008 general elections. So they were not platform conferences, but the ordinary conventions aimed to renew party leadership and party programmatic goals<sup>3</sup>. The surveys were carried out with write-in questionnaires filled in by the party delegates during the conventions<sup>4</sup>. The questionnaire, which had the same general content and structure, has been adapted to the characteristics of each party. It contained 39 questions regarding the party delegates' socio-demographic profile; political socialization; linkage with the party and other social organizations; involvement within the party; their attitudes and political orientations; and their political views and opinions<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Spanish political parties celebrate this kind of conferences every three or four years. The attendance to this kind of meetings is more restricted than platform conferences, since it become the selectorate of the party leadership (Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2011). This is the reason why we can consider these delegates the middle-level elites of political parties (Baras, 2004).

<sup>4</sup> The party organization distributed the questionnaires among the party delegates' documents and they had to fill them in during the time of the party convention. The researchers monitored the collection processes in every party convention.

<sup>5</sup> In some cases the organization asked to remove an item or not to publish its data.

**Table 1. Main characteristics of the surveyed parties (2008-2010)**

	Territory/ Region	Seats in the lower chamber	Regional Government	Left/Right identification*	
				Mean	SD
PP	Spain	154	YES	6,2	1,1
PSOE (Andalusia)	Andalusia	36 <sup>1</sup>	YES	3,7	1,0
PSC	Catalonia	25 <sup>1</sup>	YES	3,6	0,9
CDC	Catalonia	8	NO	5,0	1,2
PP (Catalonia)	Catalonia	8 <sup>1</sup>	NO	6,6	1,4
ERC	Catalonia	4	YES	3,3	1,2
CC	Canary Islands	2	YES	4,9	1,5
UDC	Catalonia	2	NO	5,4	1,0
UPN	Navarre	2	YES	6,4	1,2
ICV	Catalonia	1	YES	2,9	1,0
CHA	Aragón	1 <sup>2</sup>	NO	3,0	1,3

Source: authors' own. \*Scale 1-10, data from our surveys. (1). Elected with the same candidacy of the PSOE and the PP. (2) CHA had a seat in the low chamber until 2008

The political parties included in this research are (in alphabetic order): The *Coalición Canaria* (CC), the *Chunta Aragonesista* (CHA), the *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC), the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC), the *Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds* (ICV), the *Partido Popular* (PP), the Catalan branch of the *Partido Popular* (PP-Cat), the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC), the Andalusian branch of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE-A), the *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (UDC), and the *Unión del Pueblo Navarro* (UPN). Our original research design included all the national parties and the regionalist parties that fulfilled a basic criterion: parties that had or have had representation in either one of the two chambers (or both) of the Spanish Parliament (the *Congreso de los Diputados* and the *Senado*) in the 2004-08 or 2008-12 terms (Table 1).

Unfortunately, the survey could not be carried out to some of the national parties (PSOE, IU) or to other regionalist ones (BNG, PNV). We tried to compensate the exclusion of the PSOE conducting two additional surveys to the Andalusian branch of the PSOE and to the Catalan socialists. The PSOE-A is by far the most numerous regional branch of the socialist party. Moreover, PSOE-A and PSC provide the higher amount of MPs to the Socialist Parliamentary Group. Data from the PSC and the PSOE-A should serve as a good proxy, however imperfect, to compensate the lack of data for the national party delegates.

The surveys obtained on each party convention seem quite representative of the overall party delegates. The representativeness of the sample (Table 2) ranges from the 11,6% of the PSC to the 67% of ICV. Excluding the cases of the PSC and UDC, most of

the cases are well above the 15% of the delegates. Hence, the global results seem quite representative of the party delegates of the main political parties in Spain.

**Table 2. Representativeness of the surveys**

	Date of the Congress	Maximum number of votes casted	Number questionnaires collected	% questionnaires / votes
CC	24-26/10/2008	986	366	37,1
CDC	11-13/07/2008	2.027	551	27,2
CHA	12-13/01/2008	409	131	32,0
ERC	14/06/2008	2.722	871	40,0
ICV	21-23/11/2008	485	328	67,6
PP-CAT	5-6/07/2008	836	134	16,0
PP	20-22/06/2008	2.643	513	19,4
PSC	18-20/07/2008	1.229	142	11,5
PSOE-A	12-13/03/2010	514	157	30,5
UDC	18-19/10/2008	No data <sup>1</sup>	102	15-20 (aprox.)
UPN	19/04/2009	1.240	199	16,05

Source: author's own. (1). Our own estimation is that the number of assistants was not over 500 individuals.

We created a database for each party, and then we collect all the data in one general database ("delegate2.sav"), which is compressed by 3.494 cases. In carrying on the statistical inferences, the data has been weighted by the size of the convention (total amount of attendants) for each party. Our sample represents 25'7% of the whole attendants to party conventions surveyed.

## OPERATIONALIZATION OF PREDICTORS AND OUTCOMES

One of the problems of this kind of research is how to conceptualize and to operationalize intra-party democracy. The very concept of democracy is contested by different ideological approaches, and so it is its application to party politics (Teorell, 1999; Allern and Pedersen, 2007; Lyons, 2009). It should be noted as well that the definitions may be subject to the influence of each country's political culture or to the ideological family of the party. Thinking about the specific case of Green parties, Rüdig (2005: 10-11) proposed a definition of what he labelled as support for grassroots democracy<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> His concept was obtained through a battery of four items about the rotation of party officers, incompatibilities between organic and elected positions, the presence of women on leading positions, and the salaries of the Members of the Parliament.

**Table 3. Party delegates' opinions on the battery of intra-party democracy items (in percentages)<sup>1</sup>**

	Party leaders should be more accountable to voters than to party members		The role of party members is to give support to the decisions made by the party board.		The decisions of the national executive must prevail over those of the territorial bodies		In a political party the most important decisions must not be taken directly by their members.		SCALE OF SUPPORT TO INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY	
	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	% Submissive	% Participatory
CHA	34,9	32,5	48,4	23,8	64,6	14,2	64,8	14,8	23,3	76,7
ICV	27,3	23,6	48,6	21,2	43,9	23,4	60,9	15,2	22,9	77,1
ERC	26,1	29,2	36,6	32,1	42,2	23,1	64,1	17,1	31,5	68,5
UDC	12,0	47,0	29,3	34,3	44,0	25,0	59,2	15,3	38,8	61,2
UPN	16,0	46,9	18,5	53,0	55,4	16,7	65,9	12,0	39,8	60,2
PSC	27,0	34,8	31,9	35,5	38,6	26,4	35,7	29,3	49,1	50,9
CDC	18,8	39,8	29,4	31,8	41,0	26,7	34,3	36,2	53,3	46,7
CC	13,1	64,0	31,5	40,7	30,8	40,1	61,7	17,7	58,3	41,7
PP (Cat)	13,3	64,2	32,5	40,0	38,3	29,8	53,3	22,1	64,3	35,7
PSOE-A	5,8	49,7	19,2	49,4	17,4	41,3	44,3	23,7	69,6	30,4
PP	13,9	54,8	21,6	40,3	23,3	49,5	52,9	19,3	70,6	29,4
<b>Total</b>	<b>20,4</b>	<b>40,6</b>	<b>31,0</b>	<b>35,2</b>	<b>37,5</b>	<b>30,6</b>	<b>54,6</b>	<b>21,4</b>	<b>46,0</b>	<b>54,0</b>

Source: author's own. 1. The category "Disagree" is the sum of the percentages of respondents who positioned themselves in positions 1 (strongly disagree) and 2 (disagree). The category "Agree" is the sum of the percentages of respondents who indicated 5 (strongly agree) and 4 (agree). The indifferent ones (position 3) have not been incorporated into the table. Parties are placed in the table according to their ideology (Table 1). At the upper side are placed the right-wing parties, at the lower side are placed the left-wing parties.

The conception of intra-party democracy adopted in this paper is based on party delegates' opinions on how should be the power relations between leaders and members. To measure party delegates' opinions on this topic, a battery of four items was established in the questionnaire (see the four questions in table 3). The questions were designed so that party delegates should express strong or rather strong agreement or disagreement (from 1 to 5). Then, a scale of support for intra-party democracy has been built based on the answers to the four items. The scale was drawn from the categories generated by the party delegates' answers, ranging from 0 (no support for intra-party democracy) to 10 (very supportive). Finally, a dummy dependent variable has been built differentiating those party delegates with *participatory* attitudes from those who have been identified as *submissive* party delegates. *Participatory delegates* are operationalized as those party delegates positioned in the upper side of the scale (more than 5 up to 10). *Submissive*

*delegates* are operationalized as those party delegates located in the lower side of the scale (below 5). Party delegates in the intermediate position (5) have been excluded and considered missing cases.

The battery of questions on intra-party democracy was quite well accepted by the party delegates of the different parties. The non-response rates ranged from the 5.3% in the first question to the 9.4% for the third. Those who did not respond have been eliminated from the analysis. However, the items did not work as well as expected. A large percentage of delegates tended to locate themselves on every statement in the intermediate positions, what can be read as neither agree nor disagree (between 35.7% and 25.9% according to each item). This suggests that a large part of the party delegates weren't able to show clear preferences for each statement.

Table 3 summarizes party delegates' opinions on the four items. In the first two questions, the largest groups of the delegates from the centre and rightist parties (UPN, PP, UDC, CDC, DC) are more in favour of party leaders being more responsive to voters than party members, and more in favour that the role of party members is to support party elites decisions. In the case of centre-left and leftist parties the delegates divided at more equal rates and, eventually, the disagreement with the two statements is a little higher (CHA, ICV). In the last two items, the disagreement with the statement is much more widespread. Overall and specially derived from the answers to the last two items it can be argued that there are some demands and pressure towards intra-party democracy in Spain, although the demands are more widespread among the centre-left and leftist parties. Differences between political parties are even more visible when establishing a classification of *participatory* or *submissive* party delegates according to their position on the scale. Submissive party delegates tend to predominate in the right-wing parties (PP-Cat, PP, CC), while the participatory ones is the largest group in both parties of the Left (CHA, ICV, ERC) and of the right (UPN, UDC). The PSOE-And is interestingly as submissive as the PP.

In order to carry on the analysis, we have created some predictors following the hypothesis mentioned before. In the attitudinal model, we have employed five indicators (see Table 4). First, we developed a scale of pragmatism to differentiate between the *ideologues* from the *pragmatists* of each party. For this reason we selected a battery of three items in the questionnaire<sup>7</sup>. The answers to three questions were used to construct an index of pragmatism. The scale has been developed from the categories generated by the response from delegates and goes from 0 to 10. The closer to 0 are the delegates, the less are considered pragmatists. Second, the ideology of party delegates on the left-right scale is measured from 1 to 10. Furthermore, we have classified parties by ideology in order to distinguish between left-wing parties and right-wing parties. Fourth, we have

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<sup>7</sup> These are the items: 1) To be an active member of the party is a good way to improve one's life opportunities; 2) For political parties, the important thing is to be in government even if it means to abandon part of the party's ideology; 3) In any negotiation the party's ideology must prevail over short-term benefits.

considered ideological coherence as the situation where the individual place himself or herself and the own party in the same position in the scale left-right (1 to 10). Following Van Haute and Carty (forthcoming) we have labelled *ideological misfits* those delegates who place themselves one more positions (to the left or to the right) away than the party<sup>8</sup>. Fifth, to measure the leadership assessment we asked the delegates to give a value from 0 to 10 to the main leader from several parties.

**Table 4. Descriptors on delegates' political attitudes and ideology**

	Pragmatism			Ideology				Ideological coherence	Leadership assessment
	<i>Ideologues</i>	<i>Pragmatists</i>	<i>Mean 1-10</i>	<i>Left</i>	<i>Cent</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>Mean 1-10</i>	<i>% Misfit members</i>	<i>Mean 0-10</i>
CHA	81,3	18,7	3,7	92,9	2,4	4,7	3,0	42,3	8,1
ICV	85,2	14,8	3,4	94,8	3,3	1,9	2,9	38,9	8,1
ERC	80,4	19,6	3,6	87,9	8,8	3,3	3,3	49,1	nd
UDC	76,8	23,2	3,9	18,1	40,4	41,5	5,4	52,1	9,3
UPN	67,9	32,1	4,2	2,1	21,8	76,1	6,4	45,1	8,9
PSC	75,8	24,2	4,0	86,6	9,7	3,7	3,6	50,4	8,5
CDC	88,2	11,8	3,1	36,4	29,8	33,8	5,0	50,2	9,2
CC	68,4	31,6	4,1	33,4	41,1	25,5	4,9	49,0	8,2
PP (Cat)	75,5	24,5	3,8	2,5	20,0	77,5	6,6	66,3	6,9
PSOE-A	68,3	31,7	4,3	83,8	11,7	4,5	3,7	42,9	8,9
PP	69,9	30,1	4,1	2,2	26,2	71,7	6,2	51,1	8,2
<b>Total</b>	<b>78,3</b>	<b>21,7</b>	<b>3,7</b>	<b>52,0</b>	<b>18,9</b>	<b>29,1</b>	<b>4,5</b>	<b>49,5</b>	<b>8,6</b>

Source: author's own

<sup>8</sup> Actually Van Haute and Carty compute as misfit members those who place themselves three position (not one) or more away from the party. Since we are dealing with middle-level elites and not just party members, we assume people should express more proximity to the party central elites and, therefore, a minimal ideological distance is much more relevant for the purpose of our research.

**Table 5. Descriptors on delegates' party involvement**

	Activism				Political posts	Party seniority	
	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Mean 1-10</i>	<i>(SE)</i>	<i>with post</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>(SE)</i>
CHA	50,8	49,2	7,0	1,5	73,8	9,9	6,5
ICV	43,3	56,7	7,1	1,6	82,3	13,2	10,6
ERC	47,8	52,2	6,8	1,8	62,9	8,1	6,9
UDC	42,9	57,1	7,1	1,6	81,6	14,2	8,9
UPN	63,9	36,1	6,0	2,3	sd	10,6	8,5
PSC	34,8	65,2	7,3	1,5	78,5	13,3	10,4
CDC	37,3	62,7	7,4	1,6	81,5	12,8	9,6
CC	31,5	68,5	7,5	1,6	86,1	8,6	6,6
PP (Cat)	49,6	50,4	6,8	1,9	88,0	10,4	8,2
PSOE (And)	10,9	89,1	8,5	1,3	96,6	nd	nd
PP	25,1	74,9	7,9	1,8	82,8	13,3	8,6
<b>Total</b>	39,6	60,4	7,2	1,8	74,7	10,7	8,5

Source: author's own. In Activism, we have distinguish between Low (1 to7) and High (8-10) according to the position in the scale

To apply the incentive model, we employed six predictors (see Tables 5 and 6). First, we created a scale of activism from a battery of seven items, constructed the same way as those of pragmatism and intra-party support. Second, we distinguish between those who have a public or organisational post by the time of the party convention and those who do not. Third, party seniority was computed as the difference between the year of the party convention and the time the delegate declare having joined the party. Finally, we have created a classification of party delegates' involvement in social organizations during the past or at present: *party delegates with null social involvement* are those who are not (or haven't been) involved in other social organizations outside the party; *party delegates with low social involvement* are defined as those who are (or have been) members of up to 2 organizations; and *party delegates with high social involvement* are those party delegates who have been heavily involved in 3 or more organizations. We employed a similar predictor, defined by the degree of involvement of delegates' friends in social organization, operationalized in a similar way that the other two predictors.

**Table 6. Descriptors on delegates' social participation**

	Associationism (current)			Associationism (past)			Associationism (friends)		
	<i>Non</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Non</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Non</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
CHA	8	71,1	28,2	20,6	57,4	22,1	22,8	28,9	48,2
ICV	3,1	65,3	31,6	13,5	56,7	29,8	16,0	38,3	45,7
ERC	10,6	69,0	20,4	19,6	61,9	18,5	22,7	43,3	34,0
UDC	8,0	53,6	38,5	13,2	58,5	28,3	25,3	37,4	37,4
UPN	24,1	63,3	12,6	32,2	48,7	19,1	47,7	33,1	19,1
PSC	7,3	63,5	29,2	19,0	55,5	25,5	22,6	37,2	40,1
CDC	5,1	70,7	24,2	30,8	54,4	14,7	32,7	37,4	29,9
CC	13,1	73,4	13,5	23,1	61,1	15,8	27,3	34,9	37,8
PP (Cat)	22,4	60,8	16,8	21,6	64,0	14,4	37,6	39,2	23,2
PSOE (And)	6,4	69,4	24,2	17,9	57,3	24,8	16,9	22,5	60,5
PP	15,3	62,0	22,7	19,0	61,0	20,0	23,3	39,4	37,3
<b>Total</b>	11,1	67,3	21,6	22,0	59,3	18,6	26,0	39,7	34,4

Source: author's own

## EXPLAINING PARTY DELEGATES' SUPPORTS FOR INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY

In order to explain support for intra-party democracy amongst party delegates, we have conducted a multivariate analysis (Table 7). By building a logistic regression model, the effects of each of the independent variables selected on the analytical framework and operationalized on the previous section can be estimated. The logistic regression was conducted to assess whether our predictor variables (ideology, party ideology, activism, pragmatism, tenure of political posts, associationism, party seniority and leader support) significantly predicted whether or not a party delegate has a high support for intra-party democracy attitudes. The assumptions of observations being independent and independent variables being linearly related to the logit were checked and met. We have tested five different models, combining the ten predictors employed.

All the models significantly predicted the support of party delegates for intra-party democracy attitudes, but not all of them have the same power of explanation of the dependent variable. We started by focusing on the models defined by cultural and attitudinal indicators (Model 1) and by the participation indicators (Model 2).

Model 1 shows a negative impact of all independent variables except the ideological coherence. Thus, there is a greater propensity to express demands for greater democracy in those individuals less pragmatic, with left ideology, which belong to leftist parties, who give lower ratings to their leaders and who distance themselves ideologically from his party. Although the five variables are highly significance, as the entire model, their power to predict variance in the dependent variable is very low. Model 2 shows a negative



impact on the degree of activism, party seniority and the possession of party or public posts, while participation in voluntary associations has a positive influence on pro-democratic attitudes. The impact of the four variables is also very significant, but instead the prediction is the lowest of the five models.

The low degree of predictability offered by models 1 and 2 (as seen through the Nagelkerke  $R^2$ ) suggests that a combination of both models would improve the prediction. Model 3 collect the eleven indicators which, taken together, significantly increase the degree of variation predicted. By contrast, while maintaining the same direction of impact of each variable, it reduces the impact of some predictors and, in some cases, the significance of the relationship is lower (as it happens with the impact of holding posts and the degree of associationism). The main reason for the lower significance of the model is on the increase of missing cases produced by the combination of all predictors (we lose almost a third of the cases used in the previous two models). The most “expensive” predictors in terms of missing cases are the ratings of party leader and the party seniority. To avoid the effect of these losses, Model 4 removes both predictors. The result is positive in all respects: it reduces substantially the number of missing cases, it increases the prediction in the dependent variable and the impact of most of the variables is also increased (be it either positive or negative). However, the variable of past associationism is still non-significant and the variable of holding posts is weaker.

In Model 5 we include only those variables that have fewer missing cases and perform better on previous models: pragmatism, individual and party ideology and level of activism in the organization. Although the prediction is a bit lower, this is the most robust and parsimonious model, maintaining a high degree of significance in the impact of variables.

In sum, the odd ratios presented in Table 5 suggest that the odds of supporting intra-party democracy are increasingly greater as party activism, pragmatism, seniority and support to current leaders decrease. We also find greater support to intra-party democracy in left parties, in members with leftist ideology, in members with ideological distance compared to their own parties and amongst those who stronger roots in civil society. The combination of all of these predictors slightly increased the amount of predicted cases, but it made the model less robust. From these results, we can confirm or reject some of the hypotheses put forward above. In particular, we can confirm certainly all the hypothesis except H3, H4a, H4b and H4c. Although the impact of seniority and associationism follows the direction predicted, these factors lose significance in the aggregate models (3 and 4).

From these results, we can conclude that there is a strong relationship between middle-level elites’ support to more intra-party democracy and their political attitudes as well as their internal and external participation. However, attitudinal and ideological features of party delegates seem to be more influent on support to democracy than paths of participation and involvement in party life.

Table 7. Logistic Regression predicting who will support intraparty democracy

Variables	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Constant	2.416 ***	.102	11.2	-.228 ***	.040	.727	2.689 ***	.135	14.720	1.686	.063	5.596	1.947 ***	.048	7.010
Pragmatism	-.110 ***	.008	.896				-.118 ***	.009	.889	-.136 ***	.007	.873	-.145 ***	.007	.865
Ideology	-.277 ***	.013	.740				-.289 ***	.015	.749	-.232 ***	.011	.793	-.221 ***	.010	.802
Party Ideology	-.164 **	.052	.766				-.484 ***	.065	.616	-.718 ***	.036	.488	-.638 ***	.034	.528
Ideological Coherence	.170 ***	.031	1.186				.213 ***	.037	1.238	.276	0.27	1.317	.271 ***	.025	1.311
Leader support	-.098 ***	.009	.907				-.077 ***	.011	.916						
Activism				-.284 ***	0.28	.753	-.162 ***	.043	.851	-.124 ***	.031	.883	-.208 ***	.025	.812
Political posts				-.207 ***	.031	.813	-.111 **	.050	.895	-.099 **	.034	.905			
Associationism				.160 ***	.023	1.174	.044	.035	1.045	.160 ***	.025	1.174			
Associat. (Past)				.089 ***	.021	1.093	-.026	.030	.974	.003	.022	1.003			
Associat. (Friends)				.135 ***	.017	1.144	.046 **	.025	1.047	.100 ***	.019	1.105			
Seniority				-.318 ***	.025	.727	-.039	.040	.961						
% Prediction	62			57,3			63,8			65			63,8		
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	.090			.028			.118			.167			.150		
X <sup>2</sup>	1254,7 ***			581,3 ***			1283,0 ***			3506,0 ***			3580,7 ***		
Df	5			8			11			9			5		
N	1.772			1.987			1.255			2.001			2.364		

Significance levels \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Political parties' promotion of democratic rules and procedures is one of the key concerns in the current literature on political parties and party change. Our paper has revealed, on the one hand, that demands for intra-party democracy can be found among party delegates in Spain. This is an important finding because as we have already noted, Spain is a deviant case in both the party membership decline trends, and with the introduction of more participatory and democratic intra-party decision-making mechanisms. The Spanish figures point out that democratization pressures and demands are present before party membership declines and may well be a relevant factor in order to understand future changes in Spanish parties' intra-party procedures. Conversely, we can state that intra-party democratization don't have to be necessarily interpreted as a top-down mechanism.

On the other hand, we have tried to explore which is the support for intra party-democracy amongst party delegates. According to the literature, we set out five main factors: ideology, party ideology and ideology coherence between individual and party; their degree of pragmatism and their degree of involvement in intra-party activities. We also consider as useful predictors their involvement in social organizations; the tenure of public or party posts; the assessment of party leaders and party seniority. The results of our tests show empirical evidence on the impact generated in the support for intra-party democracy by these variables.

These data may lead us to a preliminary forecast in Spanish intra-party life. If the more keen to foster and support organizational changes to more participatory mechanism within parties are those members less involved in party life, less influential in party decisions and scarcely interested in empower their voice within parties, we cannot predict important changes within parties oriented to more democracy. At least, if these must be promoted by parties themselves. Belief can't foster intraparty changes in the Spanish case. They might only arise if parties are forced by external threats or challenges. Since party membership is not in decline in Spain, we can expect that only an electoral defeat or a collapse in party system legitimacy could eventually bring parties to a new horizons in intra-party democracy.

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